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Abstract 
The article analyses how the norm against mercenarism shapes the legitimate 
parameters of exchange in the market for military outsourcing.  The dominant 
interpretation of this dynamic is that neoliberal states and private military companies 
(PMCs) have come to restrict their transactions to non-combat functions in order to 
circumvent contemporary articulations of this norm.  The article, by contrast, contends 
that even within these narrowed parameters of exchange, neoliberal states and PMCs ǤǮǯǡe UK case, it 
explores how the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and PMCs have sought to 
appropriate symbolic capital from a domestic private security licencing regime so as to 
distance their non-combat transactions from the norm against mercenarism.  In so ǡǯ
pluralised military landscape.    
 
 
Keywords 
private military, private security, mercenarism, regulation, symbolic capital 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank the Gerda Henkel Foundation for their generous financial support 
during the course of this research (Research Fellowship award reference: AZ 11/KF/14).  I 
would also like to thank Paul Cardwell and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful 
comments on earlier drafts.  All errors are my own. 
3 
 
Introduction 
The norm against mercenarism Ȃ which condemns the practice of private soldiering Ȃ 
played a significant role in the construction of the modern world order, contributing 
decisively towards the institutionalisation of the state monopoly over violence in the 
19th century (Percy 2007a).  For much of the 20th century, it became an implicitly 
accepted feature of international politics as major wars were fought predominantly 
with state-controlled citizen armies (Thomson 1990).  At the turn of the 21st century, 
however, this norm has once again entered into the public consciousness in response to 
the controversial use of private military companies (PMCs) by Coalition forces in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.  At the height of these post-9/11 interventions, PMCs were deploying 
an estimated 54,000 armed contractors on the battlefields of the Middle East 
(Krahmann 2012: 344), with many tens of thousands more carrying out a range of 
unarmed logistical and support functions (Heinecken 2014: 629).  This trend has 
prompted commentators far and wide Ȃ from UN rapporteurs and international aid 
workers to investigative journalists and film makers Ȃ to voice their grave concerns 
over the expansion of PMC operations which, they observe, not only seek to profit from 
warfare but also function beyond established chains of command (Kruck and Spencer 
2013).   As a consequence, those actors seeking to participate in this controversial 
marketplace Ȃ in particular, neoliberal states on the buying side and PMCs on the selling 
side Ȃ have been required to navigate their transactions through contemporary 
articulations of the age-old norm against mercenarism.  The article seeks to enhance our 
understanding of this important normative dynamic.   
The most common interpretation of this dynamic Ȃ pioneered by Percy 
(2007a/b/c, 2014, 2016) and broadly reproduced throughout the field Ȃ is that 
neoliberal states and PMCs have come to strategically restrict their transactions to non-
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combat (as opposed to combat) functions so as to circumvent contemporary 
articulations of the norm against mercenarism.  Extending this interpretation, a further 
group of scholars Ȃ in particular, Leander (2010), Berndtsson (2012) and Joachim and 
Schneiker (2012) Ȃ implicitly suggest that even within these narrowed parameters of 
market exchange, neoliberal states and PMCs have been compelled to confront and 
work through these constraints by actively aligning their non-combat transactions with 
counterposed norms such as the state monopoly over violence and/or international 
humanitarianism.  The purpose of this article is to advance this nascent line of 
reasoning in a number of ways.  In empirical terms, it illustrates how since the mid-
2000s the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and UK-based PMCs have sought to 
appropriate symbolic capital from the Security Industry Authority (SIA) Ȃ the public 
body tasked with licensing the domestic private security labour market Ȃ so as to 
distance their non-combat transactions from the norm against mercenarism.  In 
theoretical terms, it accordingly reveals a new level of interplay between the agency of 
neoliberal states and PMCs and the structural constraints arising from the norm against 
mercenarism Ȃ an interplay which denotes a more extensive penetration of this norm 
into the market for military outsourcing than previously recognised.  In practical terms, 
it indicates how this newly identified normative dynamic could be used to better align 
these non-combat transactions with the public interest. 
The argument unfolds over four sections.  The next section reviews the extant 
literature on the norm against mercenarism both to set the scene and to highlight the 
contribution of the article.  The following section maps out the ǯ
perspective Ȃ namely, ǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?Ȍ Ǯglobal security 
assemblagesǯ of Ǯsymbolic capitalǯ in the 
formation of new state-market configurations across the security Ǯfieldǯ.  This section 
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also summarises the ǯ which rests upon the analysis of official 
documents and 56 semi-structured interviews with a range of stakeholders in the 
market for military outsourcing.  The subsequent section turns to the UK case, 
chronologically charting the attempts by the FCO and UK-based PMCs to appropriate 
symbolic capital from the SIA licensing regime.  The final section clarifies the empirical 
and theoretical contributions of the article, before reflecting on what this new 
understanding of the relationship between mercenarism, norms and market exchange 
tells us about the regulatory potential of this norm ǯpluralised military 
landscape. 
Before proceeding any further, however, a brief note on (inter)disciplinarity and 
terminology is required.  Over the past couple of decades, scholars writing within the 
disciplines of international relations and international law have variously termed those Ǯǯ
(PMCs)ǡǮǯ (PSCs) Ǯǯ 
(PMSCs).  At the same time, scholars writing within the field of criminology have termed 
those companies working in domestic policing contexts Ǯǯ 
(PSCs).   The same term Ȃ Ǯǯ Ȃ has therefore been used to describe two 
related but distinct types of company.  While this terminological overlap has the 
potential to cause confusion, this has largely been avoided to date because companies 
have for the most part operated in either international military contexts or domestic 
policing contexts and have therefore been studied within the disciplines of international 
relations and international law or criminology respectively.  However, in focusing on 
how the FCO and UK-based PMCs have stretched a statutory licensing regime from the 
domestic private security labour market into the international private military labour 
market, the article breaks down these scholarly distinctions.  To sidestep any 
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ǡǮǯ
is attached to those companies and labour markets operating in international military 
contexts Ǯǯattached to those companies and labour 
markets operating in domestic policing contexts.  These terminological specifications 
also serve to highlight the interdisciplinary scope of the article, which not only 
contributes towards our sociological understanding of the norm against mercenarism, 
but more broadly stands Ǯǯrelations, international law 
and criminology (Bigo 2016). 
 
Context 
The default narrative on the rise of the market for military outsourcing follows a 
distinctly rationalist neoclassical economic logic, emphasizing a series of 
supply/demand shifts which unfolded against the backdrop of the geopolitical and 
geoeconomic transformations of the late 1980s and early 1990s (for overviews see: 
Singer 2008: 49-60; Rosen 2008: 78-80; Heinecken 2014: 627-630).  The key 
geopolitical development was the so-called peace dividend which came with the ending 
of the Cold War.  With substantially reduced threat levels on the horizon, political 
leaders across the globe soon rolled out extensive military downsizing programmes 
amounting to a collective retrenchment of something like 7 million soldiers (Singer 
2008: 53).  Upon assuming office in 1993 the Clinton administration alone shrank the 
US military from 2.2 million to 1.4 million active duty soldiers, sailors, airmen and 
marines (McFate 2015: 43).  These programmes would not necessarily have caused any 
problems had the 1990s actually witnessed a period of sustained peace.  But they most ǤǮǯ
Cold War era unleashed a multitude of new conflicts Ȃ often rooted in localized ethnic 
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tensions Ȃ the world over (Kaldor 2012).  The fallout of these conflicts then shot 
destabilizing ripple effects back towards those states which had just significantly 
reduced their military capacity in anticipation of limited foreign intervention, thereby 
presenting them with a conundrum: how can we build sufficient capacity to intervene? 
The answer to this question was decisively shaped by the contemporaneous 
geoeconomic transformation taking place: the ascendance of neoliberal ideology across 
the Anglosphere.  From their intellectual roots in the New Right movement of the mid-
1970s, neoliberal economic principles Ȃ which, among other things, promote the 
privatization of public services by selling off state assets, outsourcing state functions to 
the market and restructuring state bureaucracies into quasi-markets Ȃ rapidly spread 
across the public policy landscape, spearheaded by the Thatcher and Reagan 
administrations.  By the 1990s, these principles had begun to penetrate the military 
sphere, meaning that shortfalls in military capacity were increasingly being recast as 
opportunities to incorporate private sector expertise and entrepreneurialism into slow 
moving military hierarchies (Krahmann 2010; Heinecken 2014).  So it came to be that in 
addressing the question of how to intervene, many neoliberal states turned to the host 
of new companies offering military manpower and machinery Ȃ suddenly available in 
abundance due to the post-Cold War mass demobilization Ȃ on the open market.  
Between 1950-89, PMCs were involved in 15 conflicts, while in the period 1990-2000 
they were present in no less than 80, including those in Yugoslavia, Albania, the Gulf 
region, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Congo, Angola, Sudan, Zambia Papua New Guinea and 
East Timor (Rosen 2008: 79-80).  The market for military outsourcing then experienced 
a further period of rapid expansion following the post-9/11 interventions in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, where Coalition forces found themselves facing down unexpected 
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resistance from insurgents and once again turned to this market in order to compensate 
for a shortfall in frontline capacity (Isenberg 2009).  
Despite the rationalist neoclassical economic orientation of this narrative, it is 
nevertheless widely acknowledged that these transactions were not taking place in an 
unfettered marketplace.  From the outset they were structured by, among other things, 
legacies of colonialism and racial inequalities (Chisholm 2015), gender politics (Eichler 
2015) and Ȃ our concern here Ȃ regulatory prohibitions arising from the norm against 
mercenarism.  The most instructive starting point for understanding the relationship 
between mercenarism, norms and market exchange is the work of Percy (2007a/b/c, 
2014, 2016).  She begins her analysis of these variables Ǯǯrests upon two basic analytical propositions: first, as 
elite actors pursue their rational interests in the international sphere they are required 
to negotiate their way through a series of deeply embedded intersubjective norms 
concerning the rightful constitution of the international order; second, this dialectical 
interplay between structure and agency is best captured using a narrative approach 
which empirically traces how elite actors (re)interpret and (re)shape these 
intersubjective norms across different historical contexts (Percy 2007a: 14-48).  Using 
these propositions, she illustrates how over recent decades neoliberal states and PMCs 
have attempted to transform and manipulate the hegemonic meaning of the norm 
against mercenarism so that it only criminalizes combat functions, thereby carving out a 
legitimate space for non-combat transactions within the contemporary marketplace.  
This process, she observes, has taken place over three broad stages.   
Stage one revolves around the legal institutionalization of the norm against 
mercenarism in Article 47 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions 
(1977) Ȃ a process triggered by the sporadic outbreaks of mercenary activity during the 
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African decolonization movements of the 1960s and 1970s (Singer 2008: 37-8).  Article 
47 ǡǡǮ
or abroad to fight ǯǮǯȋȌǤ  For Percy (2014: 10; 2016: 
225), the historic importance of Article 47 is not so much that it directly influenced 
subsequent attempts to institutionalize the norm against mercenarism in international 
law Ȃ which resulted in the United Nations Convention against the Recruitment, Use, 
Financing and Training of Mercenaries, completed in 1989 and operationalized in 2001 Ȃ but that it placed Ǯhtǯ.  This stipulation Ȃ taken for 
granted by the original architects of Article 47 Ȃ was to have significant repercussions 
down the line. 
 Stage two centres upon the controversy surrounding Executive Outcomes and 
Sandline International Ȃ often regarded as the first true PMCs Ȃ which were hired by 
warring factions in the Angolan, Papua New Guinean and Sierra Leonean civil conflicts 
during the 1990s (Kinsey 2006).  While both companies escaped prosecution as 
mercenary outfits under international law Ȃ which was proving to be hopelessly full of 
loopholes Ȃ their overt use of violence in the pursuit of financial gain attracted 
widespread condemnation, ultimately leading to the closure of both companies by 2004, 
and prompting Percy (2007c) to characterize anti-ǮǡǯǤ  Despite this controversy, however, neoliberal states and PMCs Ȃ in 
particular the UK, US and companies headquartered in these countries Ȃ continued to 
see opportunities in this marketplace, especially within the highly turbulent post-9/11 
era.  As a consequence, they attempted both to distance themselves from the exploits of 
Executive Outcomes and Sandline International and, at the same time, to carve out a 
legitimate space for future market exchanges.  This balancing act was accomplished, 
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Percy (2007a: 227-32; 2014: 75-7) reasons, by first making a distinction between ǮǯPMCs (such as Executive Outcomes and Sandline International) Ǯ-ǯ, and then claiming that while the former do indeed contravene the 
regulatory prohibitions arising from the norm against mercenarism Ȃ as Article 47 
would suggest with its explicit Ǯǯ Ȃ the latter do not (see also 
Petersohn 2014: 482-489).   
 Stage three concerns the consolidation of this distinction during the course of the 
Coalition interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan.  While many accusations of 
mercernarism were targeted towards the post-9/11 market for military outsourcing, 
most related to instances where PMCs were clearly engaged in aggressive combat 
behavior (Panke and Petersohn 2011: 730) Ȃ the paradigmatic case being the notorious 
2007 Nisour Square massacre, when contractors working for Blackwater killed 
seventeen Iraqi civilians and injured at least twenty more during a fifteen minute shoot-
up in the middle of a busy Baghdad intersection (see Scahill 2007: 3-9).  Non-combat 
PMC operations were, so ǯ argument goes, for the most part able to stay out of the 
public eye, quietly gaining tacit acceptance.  This process of legitimation was facilitated, 
moreover, by the voluntary regulatory regimes coming into effect at this time (Percy 
2014).  These regimes emerged through a combination of international initiatives such 
as the Swiss-led Montreux Process and the efforts of trade associations such as the 
International Peace Operations Association in the US and the British Association of 
Private Security Companies and the Aerospace, Defence, Security and Space Group in 
the UK.   Their collective endeavors resulted in the 2008 Montreux Document, 2010 
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, the 2011 PSC 
Series of Standards and the 2015 ISO Management System for Private Security 
Operations (ISO 18788) (Avant 2016; Krahmann 2016).  Crucially, all of these regimes 
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were predicated on the legitimacy of non-combat transactions in the market for military 
outsourcing and thus served to consolidate this narrowed space of exchange.  This leads 
Percy (2014:  ? ?ȌǣǮǡǲǳǡome 
the defining factor of a mercenary, and the anti-mercenary norm is now restricted to ǯǤ   
This interpretation, which carefully balances the agency of neoliberal states and 
PMCs with the structural constraints arising from the norm against mercenarism, is 
highly persuasive and has rightly gained considerable traction across the field.  That 
said, an additional group of constructivist scholars Ȃ in particular, Leander (2010), 
Berndtsson (2012) and Joachim and Schneiker (2012) Ȃ have sought to push this line of 
argumentation further by (often implicitly) suggesting that even within these narrowed 
parameters of market exchange, neoliberal states and PMCs are required to confront 
and work through the norm against mercenarism.  They have done so by making 
sociological sense of tell-tale behaviours in the market for military outsourcing.  
Leander (2010), for example, points towards the Ǯǯ
between US public office and US-based PMC executive boards, observing how Ǯhere is a 
strong pressure both on PMCs and states wishing to work with them to ensure that ǯ those of the state as ǯ(Leander 2010: 482).  Ǯǯallows these 
actors to enhance Ǯǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ? ?Ȍ non-combat 
transactions, thereby distancing them from ongoing articulations of the norm against 
mercenarism (Leander 2010: 482).  Similarly, Joachim and Schneiker (2012, p.375) note 
the tendency of US- and UK-based PMCs to shroud their operations in the discourse and 
symbolism of international humanitarianism by contributing to humanitarian charities, 
forging alliances with and recruiting from humanitarian organizations, appropriating 
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humanitarian imagery such as the symbol for the United Nation global compact and 
covering their websites with references to human rights.  These practices, they reason, 
help PMCs Ǯǲǳǲ-ǳ
establish themselvǯ.  
 While it is not necessarily their explicit intention, these analyses deepen our 
understanding of the relationship between mercenarism, norms and market exchange.  
In empirical terms, they indicate that, even within the supposedly legitimated space of 
market exchange demarcated by Percy, neoliberal states and PMCs have been required 
to circumvent the norm against mercenarism by aligning their operations with 
counterposed norms relating to the state monopoly over violence and/or international 
humanitarianism.  In theoretical terms, they bring into frame a new kind of interplay 
between the agency of neoliberal states and PMCs and the structural constraints arising 
from the norm against mercenarism.  These emergent empirical and theoretical lines of 
enquiry are picked up and further developed throughout the ensuing case study, which 
illustrates how since the mid-2000s the FCO and UK-based PMCs Ȃ following a similar 
logic to the aforementioned ǮǯǮǯȂ have 
sought to appropriate symbolic capital from the SIA in order to distance their non-
combat transactions from the norm against mercenarism.  Before commencing with this 
discussion, however, it is first necessary to map out the theoretical and methodological 
approaches which underpin this case study narrative.  
 
Theory and Method 
In recent years, scholars of military and security governance have advanced a range of 
organising perspectives to describe, explain and evaluate the pluralisation of the 
contemporary military landscape, each of which has variable utility depending on the 
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precise questions under examination (for an overview see: Kruck 2014).  For present 
purposes the global security assemblages approach put forward by Abrahamsen and 
Williams (2009, 2011) serves as a particularly valuable heuristic because it captures to 
great effect the empirical dynamics and theoretical implications arising from the 
ensuing case study.  Their approach is animated by a desire to better comprehend the 
complex security regimes they encountered while conducting fieldwork in Kenya, 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone and South Africa during the 2000s.  In pursuit of this goal, they 
draw together a series of concepts and propositions from three theoretical bases: 
assemblage theoryǡǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ǯȋ ? ? ? ?) ǮǯǮǯǤ    
 To begin with, Abrahamsen and Williams (2009, 2011) borrow from the basic 
conceptual vocabulary of assemblage theory.  In laying out this vocabulary, it is useful to 
make a distinction between assemblage-as-noun and assemblage-as-verb.  As a noun, it 
refers to a particular configuration of socio-spatial relations Ȃ ǮǯǤ
verb, it relates to the structure-agency dialectics which bring such configurations into 
effect Ȃ ǮǯǤ is the strength of the 
theory, for it facilitates the description and explanation of a fluid and ever changing 
social world in which there are no ontological certainties (Anderson and McFarlane 
2011).  Iǡǡǯ
and reifying conventional demarcations ofǡǡǮstate Ǯǯ.  This flexibility proves 
highly attractive to Abrahamsen and Williams, who uncover a range of security regimes 
which defy such demarcations.   They accordingly use assemblage-as-noun throughout 
their approach, referring to novel configurations of state-market relations across the Ǯǯ.  They devote most of their time, however, to 
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exploring assemblage-as-verb Ȃ the process of assembling.  It is this focus which duly 
guides their engagement with the writings of Sassen and Bourdieu.  
Abrahamsen and Williams use ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍwork on globalization to explain 
in more precise terms how global security assemblages come into effect.  In particular, 
they follow her lead in breaking this process down into three phases: the Ǯǯ
phase in which formerly sovereign (security) functions are, to varying degrees, 
transferred from the state to the market; Ǯǯ
state and market actors accumulate the resources they need to navigate their way 
through in this new pluralized (security) setting; and tǮǯ
state and market actors settle into more regularised patterns of behavior, thus giving 
rise to distinctive new global (security) assemblages (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011: 
91).  For Abrahamsen and Williams, these propositions give the often nebulous process 
of assembling a coherent and logical narrative structure.   
Finally, Abrahamsen and Williams draw upon Bourdieuǯ (1990) concepts of ǮǯǮǯ to elaborate upon the capacity development phase. i  In this phase, 
they reason, state and market actors seek to augment their agency by strategically 
realizing those particular forms of capital which find most resonance within the security 
field.  While they recognize that Ǯeconomicǯ capital (cash and access to markets), Ǯsocialǯ 
capital (professional networks and leadership skills) and Ǯculturalǯ capital (experience 
and expertise) are all key resources, they ultimately argue Ȃ following Bourdieu (1990, 
1999) Ȃ that Ǯsymbolicǯ capital (legitimacy and authority) carries the most significance, 
especially the symbolic capital of the state (see also Diphoorn and Grassiani 2016).  ǮHistory weighs heavily on the security fieldǯǡthey ǡǮthe very origins of the 
modern (and later liberal democratic) state were defined by its opposition to the notion ǲǳǥǡǯ
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(Abrahamsen and Williams 2011: 111-2).  It is this state-centric historical bearing Ȃ 
encompassing, among other social structures, the conjoined norms against 
mercenarism and for the state monopoly over violence Ȃ which compels so many actors 
in the capacity development phase to enhance the publicness of their security 
operations through the realization of the symbolic capital of the state (see also White 
2010, 2012; Diphoorn and Grassiani 2016).  Expressed differently, they draw attention 
to a distinctive structure-agency dynamic rooted in the historical terrain of the security 
field.    
To summarise, the global security assemblages approach (as depicted here) 
advances three interconnected propositions: 
 
i) global security assemblages are newly emergent socio-spatial 
configurations in the security field which may or may not correspond 
with conventional demarcations of state and market; 
ii) the processes of assembly which bring these configurations into effect 
tend to unfold over three phases Ȃ disassembly, capacity development 
and reassembly; 
iii) the capacity development phase is characterised by a distinctive 
structure-agency dynamic in which participating actors seek to realise the 
symbolic capital of the state in an attempt to navigate their way through a 
series of deeply embedded state-centric norms. 
 
In the following section, these propositions are used to organise the empirics of this 
case study into three phases: a disassembly phase in which the FCO contracts out 
formerly sovereign non-combat protective functions to UK-based PMCs; a capacity 
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development phase in which both sets of actors seek to infuse these functions with the 
symbolic capital of the state in an effort to distance themselves from contemporary 
articulations of the norm against mercenarism; and a reassembly phase in which all 
individual contractors caught up in these transactions are required to carry an SIA 
licence, thereby creating a novel global security assemblage which defies conventional 
state-market demarcations.  Before proceeding any further, however, it is necessary to 
briefly discuss the origins of the data on which this case study is based. 
The article seeks to make sociological sense of tell-tale behaviours displayed by 
the FCO and UK-based PMCs in the market for military outsourcing.  It does so using 
two complementary qualitative methodologies.  First, analysing relevant documents 
generated by the FCO over the past decade or so, including formal reports and personal 
correspondence with officials.  Second, undertaking semi-structured interviews with 
knowledgeable stakeholders in this marketplace.   Between 2012 and 2015, I conducted 
and transcribed interviews with 18 private military contractors, 13 private military 
company executives, 22 representatives from the veterans charity sector and 3 former 
civil servants, all with current or past connections to the UK market for military 
outsourcing.  Of these, 14 contractors (hereafter C1 - C14), 12 executives (hereafter E1 Ȃ 
E12), 4 charity workers (hereafter CW1 Ȃ CW4) and all 3 civil servants (hereafter CS1 Ȃ 
CS3) were able to offer insights into the presence of SIA licences in the UK market for 
military outsourcing.  In what follows, these documentary and interview datasets are 
interpreted using the global security assemblages approach to generate a theoretically-
informed empirical case study narrative.   
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Findings 
To begin with, it is necessary to introduce two events which unfolded during the course 
of 2001, one very well known, the other less so.  On 11th May 2001, the Private Security 
Industry Act (PSIA) passed into the UK statute books.  During its passage through 
Parliament this item of legislation was shaped by two formal regulatory goals: to reduce 
criminality and to raise standards within the domestic private security industry.  To 
achieve these goals, the PSIA provided for the establishment of the SIA Ȃ a non-
departmental public body accountable to the Home Office and tasked with licensing 
individual contractors within the domestic private security labour market.  At the same 
time, however, this legislation was also driven by a less formal goal: to legitimate the 
industryǯ in the face of widespread anxiety about the rise of commercial 
interests in what many citizens regarded as the sacrosanct domain of the state (White 
2010, 2012).  For decades, PSC executives had lobbied for the introduction of regulation 
in anticipation that the resulting licensing regime could be deployed as a valuable form 
of symbolic capital within this highly state-centric field.  The establishment of the SIA 
represented the culmination of their efforts.  By 2004, this new public body was up and 
running and, barring a few high-profile administrative errors during its initial period of 
operation, has been functioning relatively smoothly ever since (White 2015).   
Four months to the day after the PSIA entered into the UK statute books, al-
Qaeda suicide bombers hijacked four passenger jets in US airspace, flying two of them 
into the Twin Towers, one into the Pentagon and crash landing the other into a field 
after a passenger intervention.  This event sparked the War on Terror Ȃ a highly 
emotive US-led military offensive against the perpetrators and supporters of global 
terrorism.  The offensive comprised two primary combat operations: the 2001 invasion 
of Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban regime, which formally drew to a close in 2014; 
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and the 2003 invasion of Iraq to depose Saǯ ǯime, which 
formally reached a conclusion in 2011.  In each operation, the UK military was the 
second largest contributor of troops behind the US military.  Though seemingly worlds 
apart, these two events Ȃ the passing of the PSIA and the 9/11 terrorist attacks Ȃ 
gradually became entwined over the ensuing decade through the interlinked processes 
of disassembly, capacity development and reassembly unfolding across the UK military 
landscape.  Each phase is examined in turn. 
 As the War on Terror gathered pace, the FCO Ȃ like many other UK government 
departments contributing towards the US-led military offensives in Iraq and 
Afghanistan Ȃ was faced with a growing number of acute logistical dilemmas.  It was 
being called upon, for instance, to commit ever more staff to UK embassies and 
diplomatic missions in these countries, but without additional protection from a 
military already struggling to suppress unexpected levels of insurgent activity.  
Paralleling equivalent decision making processes in the US Departments of State and 
Defense, the FCO addressed this conundrum by turning to the marketplace, outsourcing 
approximately £124 million worth of non-combat functions (e.g. static and mobile 
protection) to Control Risks and ArmorGroup Ȃ two of the most prominent UK-based 
PMCs Ȃ between May 2003 and August 2006 (Kinsey 2009: 166).  This decision set in 
motion an initial disassembly phase in which the FCO and UK-based PMCs together 
oversaw the transfer of formerly sovereign military functions from the state to the 
market.   
 In the immediate wake of this disassembly phase, the FCO and UK-based PMCs 
promptly entered into a capacity development phase, seeking to realize those particular 
forms of capital which found most resonance within this newly pluralized field.  At this 
important juncture, both the FCO and UK-based PMCs immediately gravitated towards 
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the SIA licensing regime, stipulating that UK contractors performing frontline roles 
within the international private military labour market must hold an SIA close 
protection (CP) licence.  As one executive puts it: Ǯ[SIA] licence first came in, 
PMCs saw it as a selling point.  Then when the FCO started demanding it for their 
contrǡǯȋ ?).  But precisely what form of capital were the FCO 
and UK-based PMCs seeking to realise through the incorporation of the SIA CP licence 
into their non-combat transactions?   
 The most straightforward answer is that through this stipulation the formal 
benefits of the SIA licensing regime Ȃ to reduce criminality and to raise standards Ȃ 
would be translated from the domestic private security labour market into the 
international private military labour market.  In other words, it would serve to realize a 
key form of economic capital Ȃ improved quality in the labour market.   However, there 
is reason to challenge this answer.  To begin with, the SIA-accredited training 
programmes were devised for low risk CP work in the UK and had only limited 
applicability to high risk CP work in Iraq and AfghanistanǤǮhe SIA licence has 
competency tests which only make sense in environments like the UKǯǡǡǮt has no relevance ǯȋ ?).  One contractor articulates 
this concern in slightly more prosaic termsǣǮǯǤǯ (C1).  Furthermore, there 
are no regulatory mechanisms (e.g. inspection visits) by which the SIA can monitor and 
enforce its licensing regime in the international private military labour market Ȃ a 
deficiency about which the FCO was already acutely aware (FCO 2002, p.24).  This lack 
of monitoring capacity also explains why there is no record of how many SIA CP licences 
have circulated through the international private military labour market Ȃ there is 
simply no paper trail beyond the UK.  All things considered, there appears to be only a 
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very limited amount of latent economic capital bound up within the SIA CP licence, 
meaning this straightforward answer fails to persuade on its own. 
 Drawing upon ǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?Ȍcapacity 
development, an alternative answer is that through this stipulation the less formal 
benefits of the SIA licensing regime Ȃ the realization of symbolic capital within the state-
centric security field Ȃ would be translated from the domestic private security labour 
market into the international private military labour market.  In principle, the 
mechanics involved in unlocking this symbolic capital run as follows.  Individuals 
seeking to work on any contract containing this stipulation must go through the SIA CP 
licence application process which includes, among other things, a criminal records 
check and a mandatory training course.  Upon successful completion, they will be issued 
a photocard with a unique identification number set against the backdrop of the regal-
looking SIA kitemark (SIA 2013) (see Figure 1).  This photocard is symbolically 
powerful.  The holder is endorsed not just by the SIA, but also Ȃ tracing the democratic 
line of accountability upwards Ȃ the Home Office, Government, Parliament and, 
ultimately, the public.  ǡǡǯ
democratic authority (White 2010).  The value of this particular form of symbolic 
capital within the market for military outsourcing is that it potentially helps to shield 
neoliberal states and PMCs against the critique that their non-combat transactions 
stand in violation of the norm against mercenarism.  It communicates to onlookers that 
they are employing professional contractors endorsed and controlled by the democratic 
state, not cowboy mercenaries.  In short, it gives them a form of legitimacy and 
authority they otherwise lack.  
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Figure 1: The SIA Close Protection Licenceii 
 
 
 
 This alternative explanation is especially persuasive given that the FCO and UK-
based PMCs had good reason to be concerned about such critiques at this time.  During 
the course of 2004, a number of US-based PMCs working for the US government in Iraq Ȃ Blackwater, CACI, Custer Battles and Titan being the most notorious Ȃ found 
themselves embroiled in a series of high-profile scandals involving execution, torture 
and fraud (see Scahill 2007; Whyte 2007; White 2016).  Each passing controversy, 
observe Franke and van Boemcken (2011: 736), consolidated the representation of 
PMCs working in Iraq as Ǯ-grabbing, gun-toting, thrill-seeking Rambo-type 
mercenaries with little or no moral inhibition or concern for ethical ǯǤ  Crucially, 
this representation soon began to cross the Atlantic.  After performing a discourse 
analysis on 191 PMC-related newspaper articles from The Daily Telegraph (UK), The 
Guardian (UK), The New York Times (US) and The Washington Post (US) in the period 
2004 to 2011, Kruck and Spencer (2013, p.331) discovered that the four most dominant Ǯǯȋ ? ? ?ȌǡǮǯȋ ? ? ?ȌǡǮǯȋ ? ? ?ȌǮǯȋ ? ? ?Ȍ.  
Despite the relative absence of scandals involving the UK Government and UK-based 
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PMCs, the norm against mercenarism was clearly finding voice in UK public discourse.  
It therefore seems likely that the FCO and UK-based PMCs would not only seek to 
proactively defend themselves against such critiques arising from the norm against 
mercenarism, but would proceed do so by appropriating the readily accessible symbolic 
capital offered by the SIA CP licence.   
 Speaking to this line of reasoning, one civil servant working for the SIA at the 
time recalls how: 
 	ǤǡǤǯ
want UK companies to be associated with torture and killing because of how it ǥȏ	Ȑ
form of regulation on UK companies operating in hostile environments and 
chatted to the SIA (CS1).  
 
Reinforcing this logic, another civil servant remembers how for PMCsǣǮ[the SIA CP 
licence] was a badge that, in the absence of any other badges, companies grasped in the ǯȋ ?ȌǤǡǡ Ǯf there was a problem we ǲǡǳǯȋ ?).   Another expands on 
this theme: Ǯǯ licence [by law], but a large number of our 
clients ask for it.  Our clients like SIA licences.  TheǯǤǯ (E4).  Neatly summing up this process, one SAS 
solider-turned contractor notes in his autobiography of the post-9/11 private military 
labour market: 
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The SIA has nothing to do with hostile environments, ǯ
CSCs [commercial security companies] from using the organization as a 
marketing tool to win contracts in places like Afghanistan and Iraq.  Many CSCs 
boast to potential clients that its employees are SIA accǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǡ
p.256). 
 
Against the backdrop of ǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?Ȍinsights into capacity 
development, these attempts by the FCO and UK-Ǯǯ
themselves from Ǯǯin the market for military outsourcing through the ǮǯǮǯǮǯǮǯseem to coalesce around a single overarching point: in this state-centric 
marketplace, deeply permeated by the norm against mercenarism, these actors were 
using the SIA CP licence as a form of symbolic capital in order to enhance the publicness Ȃ and by extension legitimacy and authority Ȃ of their still tainted non-combat 
transactions. 
 It thus seems more likely that the FCO and UK-based PMCs were seeking to 
realize symbolic rather than economic capital from the SIA licensing regime.  Yet it is 
important to emphasise that these two processes are not necessarily mutually exclusive Ȃ they may in fact be entwined.  For instance, in their Bourdieu-inspired study of how 
different forms of capital are realized in the Kenyan, Jamaican and Israeli markets for 
security, Diphoorn and Grassiani (2016) note how actors first seek to accumulate 
readily accessible forms of economic, social and cultural capital, before eventually Ǯǯ symbolic capital Ȃ ǮǯǤDifferent forms of capital do not therefore necessarily exist in silos Ȃ they can 
instead be co-constitutive.  Applying this observation to the present discussion, the 
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capacity development phase is perhaps best summed up as a process through which the 
FCO and UK-based PMCs sought ǮǯǮǯ
economic capital Ȃ such as the SIA CP licence Ȃ into symbolic capital so as to legitimate 
their non-combat transactions in the face of critiques arising from the norm against 
mercenarism. 
 Regardless of the precise mechanisms at play, however, this capacity 
development phase resulted in the same outcome in the subsequent reassembly phase Ȃ 
it caused the SIA CP licence to quickly spread throughout the UK share of the 
international private military labour market, thereby bringing into effect a new global 
security assemblage which cuts across previously entrenched state-market 
demarcationsǤǮ ? ? ? ?ǯǡanother SAS soldier-turned-contractor-turned-author ǡǮ[individual 
contactor] had to attend a course properly approved by the Security Industry Authority, 
who suddenly found themselves catapulted from regulating night club bouncers to 
dealing with hardcore ǯȋ
 ? ? ? ?ǣ210).   Another contractor similarly 
recalls the ubiquity of ǣǮǤ
Companies were asking for your SIA number on applications.  It was seen as a pain.  You 
juǯ (C2).  Furthermore, this practice continues today.  In December 
2016, for example, the FCO released an invitation to tender for a £14 million contract 
protecting UK government officials in Baghdad and Erbil.iii  This invitation listed Ǯ
Licence Ȃ ȋ	Ȍǯ as one of the ǮsǯǤiv  It is 
therefore unsurprising to discover that ǯpresent 
recruitment policy in the following terms: Ǯthing we will not ǤǯǤ
[operatives] ǯ (E5).  More than a decade on, the FCO and UK-based PMCs are 
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thus still engaged in the process of appropriating economic and (most importantly) 
symbolic capital from the SIA licensing regime so as to shield their non-combat 
transactions from critiques arising from the norm against mercenarism.  
 
Conclusion 
The preceding analysis allows us to build upon ǯ(2007a/b/c, 2014, 2016) 
dominant interpretation of the relationship between mercenarism, norms and market 
exchange in empirical, theoretical and practical terms.  In empirical terms, it reveals the 
dynamics of a previously unacknowledged strategy for realizing symbolic capital in the 
market for military outsourcing Ȃ ǮǯǤWhen this strategy is placed 
alongside the Ǯǯȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǮǯȋJoachim and 
Schneiker 2012) strategies for realising symbolic capital mentioned earlier, we have a 
much stronger evidence base for advocating a new set of empirical connections 
between mercenarism, norms and market exchange.  Not only have neoliberal states 
and PMCs come to strategically restrict their transactions to non-combat (as opposed to 
combat) functions so as to circumvent the norm against mercenarism, as Percy 
suggests.  But even within these narrowed parameters of exchange, they have been 
required to confront and work through these constraints by actively aligning their non-
combat transactions with counterposed norms such as the state monopoly over 
violence and/or international humanitarianism.  This finding opens out and further 
develops an important new avenue of empirical enquiry into the relationship between 
mercenarism, norms and market exchange.   
In theoretical terms, it generates new insights into the interplay between 
structure and agency in the market for military outsourcing.  ǯ
structure-agency dialectic which functions in accordance with a single logic: neoliberal 
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states and PMCs have used their agency to transform the structural constraints arising 
from the norm against mercenarism so that its regulatory prohibitions only criminalize 
combat functions, thereby carving out a legitimate space for non-combat transactions 
within the market for military outsourcing.  The preceding analysis, however, brings 
into frame an additional logic: neoliberal states and PMCs have also used their agency to 
imbue these resulting non-combat transactions with the symbolic capital of the state so 
as to work around the still present structural constraints arising from the norm against 
mercenarism.  The key implication here is that these structural constraints are actually 
far more deeply embedded in the market for military outsourcing Ȃ and accordingly 
place much greater demands on the agency of neoliberal states and PMCS Ȃ than Peǯ
analysis indicates.  This also speaks to a wider theoretical point about the limits of the ǯ landscape.  Because the historical imprint of the Ǯǯǡȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ? ?-2) 
put it, the transfer of formerly sovereign military functions from state to market is 
invariably met with firmly entrenched cultural resistance.  To facilitate this transfer 
with any kind of success participating actors are thus required to engage in a complex 
and ongoing process of brokering, positioning and management.  Indeed, one of the 
central messages of this article is that this process should not be underestimated.  The 
identification of this additional structure-agency dynamic thus carves out a significant 
new avenue of theoretical enquiry not just into the relationship between mercenarism, 
norms and market exchange, but also into the cultural limits of the market for military 
outsourcing more broadly. 
 In practical terms, these empirical and theoretical findings allow us to reappraise 
the regulatory potential bound up within the norm against mercenarism.  Broadly 
speaking, the contours of regulatory debate in this field have been implicitly and 
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explicitly shaped by ǯdistinction between illegitimate combat transactions and 
legitimate non-combat transactions in the market for military outsourcing.  This is 
evident in extant scholarship on both the United Nations Convention against the 
Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries and the various post-9/11 
voluntary regulatory regimes (Avant 2016; Krahmann 2016).  This scholarship is 
certainly valuable, yet it often misses how the regulatory prohibitions arising from the 
norm against mercenarism could also be harnessed to better align non-combat 
transactions with the public interest.  As the preceding discussion illustrates, these 
prohibitions have pushed neoliberal states and PMCs to symbolically associate their 
non-combat transactions with counterposed norms relating to the state monopoly over 
violence and/or humanitarianism.   While this may of course be rather cynical process, 
motivated more by realpolitik than idealism, in making this association they are 
nevertheless interweaving these transactions with principles of professionalism, 
accountability and human rights.  Recognising this confluence of non-combat 
transactions and regulatory principles could provide those organisations responsible 
for protecting the public interest in the sector with valuable channels of regulatory 
communication and persuasion.  If they were, for instance, to positively question 
neoliberal states and PMCs about their commitment to these principles in public forums Ȃ pointing to their licence appropriation, revolving door and discursive alignment 
strategies Ȃ then it may be possible to deepen the penetration of these principles within 
their non-combat transactions.  This suggestion reveals an interesting new avenue of 
regulatory enquiry into the relationship between mercenarism, norms and market 
exchange.  
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